The authors used R. Folger and R. Cropanzano's (1998 ) fairness theory to derive predictions about the effects of explanation provision and explanation adequacy on justice judgments and cooperation, retaliation, and withdrawal responses. The authors also used the theory to identify potential moderators of those effects, including the type of explanation (justification vs. excuse), outcome favorability, and study context. The authors' predictions were tested by using meta-analyses of 54 independent samples. The results showed strong effects of explanations on both the justice and response variables. Moreover, explanations were more beneficial when they took the form of excuses rather than justifications, when they were given after unfavorable outcomes, and when they were given in contexts with instrumental, relational, and moral implications.
Organizational life is rife with decisions that affect the interests of employees (Sitkin & Bies, 1993) . For example, management might inform the organization of imminent layoffs, announce a merger with another firm, or institute a new drug-testing policy. Within the organization, a supervisor could approve a subordinate's budget request, deny a request for a salary increase, or provide a lower-than-expected performance evaluation. Each of these events would seem to demand some sort of explanation, particularly when the decision was unfavorable or somehow controversial.
Unfortunately, many organizations fail to supply explanations for key events or provide explanations that are so vague that they lack real information (Folger & Skarlicki, 2001; Smeltzer & Zener, 1992) . In a recent review, Folger and Skarlicki (2001) attempted to explain "why tough times can lead to bad management" (p. 97). The authors argued that managers distance themselves from employees who receive bad news and fail to provide adequate explanations as a result. This distancing can occur for several reasons, including emotional distress or fear of being blamed for a negative outcome. It may also result from apprehension about triggering a wrongful termination or discrimination lawsuit.
Recent magazine and newspaper headlines have demonstrated the tendency for organizations to withhold adequate explanations. Consider the recent layoffs at Dell Computer, a company rated as one of Fortune magazine's "100 Best Companies to Work For" (Levering & Moskowitz, 2000) . Like many companies, Dell has reacted to the recent economic downturn with a series of job and pay cuts. A recent Time magazine article illustrated how one layoff event was handled (Cohen & Thomas, 2001 ). An e-mail instructed employees to attend a meeting at a nearby hotel, where they found a set of managers whom they had never met. The authors wrote:
The bosses stuck to their script. The economy was bad. We can't afford to keep you. So we're not. Hand in your badges on the way out. There were no individual explanations for why these workers-out of a work force of 40,000 -had been picked. The members of the firing squad never introduced themselves. It was over in eight minutes. (p. 38) Even though it is logical for organizations to be concerned about revealing confidential information or triggering a damaging lawsuit, the failure to give an explanation-or the use of an inadequate one-could have adverse consequences. Academic research has linked the absence of adequate explanations to decreased levels of cooperation (e.g., task and citizenship behaviors; Colquitt, 2001; Konovsky & Cropanzano, 1991) , increased levels of retaliation (e.g., litigation intentions, theft; Greenberg, 1990; Wanberg, Bunce, & Gavin, 1999) , and increased levels of withdrawal (e.g., turnover intentions; Ball, Trevino, & Sims, 1993; Konovsky & Cropanzano, 1991) . Much of this research has measured or manipulated variation in explanation provision, defined here as the extent to which an explanation is given for a decision. Other research has measured or manipulated variation in explanation adequacy, defined as the extent to which provided explanations are clear, reasonable, and detailed.
The research cited previously has shown that adequate explanations can have beneficial effects, but the explanations literature remains unclear on three key issues. First, the size of explanation effects has been inconsistent; some studies have reported strong zero-order effects (e.g., Gilliland & Beckstein, 1996; Greenberg, 1990) , whereas others have reported nonsignificant ones (e.g., Gilliland, 1994; Schaubroeck, May, & Brown, 1994) . Second, the merits of different types of explanations remain uncertain. Some studies have shown that excuses, where the authority shifts responsibility to some external cause, can have beneficial results (e.g., Crant & Bateman, 1993; Tata, 2000) . Others have suggested that justifications, which admit responsibility while appealing to higher order concerns, are more effective (Bobocel & Farrell, 1996; Conlon & Murray, 1996) .
Finally, research on where and when to provide adequate explanations has proven inconclusive. Some studies have predicted that explanations are more beneficial in light of unfavorable outcomes, but the results have been inconsistent (e.g., Colquitt & Chertkoff, 2002; Gilliland, 1994; Ployhart, Ryan, & Bennett, 1999; Schaubroeck et al., 1994) . Moreover, some studies have linked explanations to key outcomes in intuitively important contexts, such as layoffs or evaluation procedures (e.g., Cobb, Vest, & Hills, 1997; Wanberg et al., 1999) , whereas others have shown only marginal effects in those settings (e.g., Mellor, 1992; Rousseau & Tijoriwala, 1999; Skarlicki, Ellard, & Kelln, 1998) .
The purpose of this study was to conduct a meta-analytic review of the explanations literature. In so doing, we structured our review around the propositions of fairness theory-a recently introduced integrative theory of organizational justice (Folger & Cropanzano, 1998 ). Fairness theory is particularly relevant to the study of explanations and can provide a useful framework for examining their effects. The theory was recently applied to the study of explanations by Gilliland, Groth, Baker, Dew, Polly, and Langdon (2001) and Colquitt and Chertkoff (2002) . Both studies illustrated that fairness theory can be useful in deriving predictions regarding how, where, and when explanations should be most effective. In this article, we provide a brief overview of the explanations literature and discuss the basic components of fairness theory. We then use fairness theory to structure our specific hypotheses.
Overview of the Explanations Literature
Interest in explanations can be traced back to several early works in psychology, sociology, and philosophy (for a review, see Schlenker, 1980) . According to Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (1998) , an explanation is the act or process of "making something clear or understandable." The term implies revealing the reason for, or the cause of, some event that is not immediately obvious or entirely known. Much of the scholarly interest in explanations may have been triggered by Scott and Lyman's (1968) general purpose taxonomy of explanations. They distinguished between two types of explanations: excuses and justifications.
Excuses are defined as explanations in which the decision maker admits that the act in question is unfavorable or inappropriate but denies full responsibility by citing some external cause or mitigating circumstance. For example, a soldier might admit to having killed other people, an immoral act, but explain that he or she was following orders and therefore was not fully responsible (Scott & Lyman, 1968) . With justifications, the decision maker accepts full responsibility but denies that the act in question is inappropriate by pointing to the fulfillment of some superordinate goal. For example, a soldier might justify killing others by asserting that his or her side is fighting for the cause of freedom (Scott & Lyman, 1968) .
Over the past three decades, researchers have further refined Scott and Lyman's (1968) taxonomy (Bies, 1987b; Bies, 1989; Schlenker, 1980; Schönbach, 1990; Sitkin & Bies, 1993; Tedeschi & Reiss, 1981 ). Schlenker's (1980) work further clarified the nature of both excuses and justifications by noting that excuses can point to either unforeseen consequences or extenuating circumstances, while justifications can draw on relevant social comparisons or higher order goals. Tedeschi and Reiss (1981) argued that excuses can point to a lack of intention, planning, capacity, or volition, and justifications can appeal to a higher authority, ideology, norms, or loyalties. Finally, work by Bies applied new terms to the excuse and justification concepts (Bies, 1987b; Bies, 1989; Sitkin & Bies, 1993) . He termed excuses as causal accounts or mitigating accounts, while justifications were labeled ideological accounts or exonerating accounts.
The literature on explanations is several decades old, but a chapter by Bies and Moag (1986) created a renewed interest in the concept. The authors characterized an allocation decision as a sequence of three events: (a) the following of a procedure; (b) an interaction between the allocator and allocation recipient(s), and (c) the allocation of the outcome. In so doing, Bies and Moag (1986) called attention to the interpersonal communication process, which had been neglected in previous research in the organizational justice literature. They also identified specific principles that promote fairness during the interaction phase. One of those principles is the provision of an adequate explanation.
Since Bies and Moag's (1986) discussion of explanations, scholars have used explanation provision as well as explanation adequacy to predict a variety of outcomes. Most commonly, explanations have been used to predict the perceived fairness of decision outcomes (i.e., distributive justice) and the perceived fairness of decision-making processes (i.e., procedural justice). This last outcome is particularly common, given that justice scholars have argued that explanations are a critical aspect of proper procedural enactment (Bies & Moag, 1986; Folger & Bies, 1989; Tyler & Bies, 1990) . Some studies have shown that explanations improve such justice judgments (e.g., Gilliland & Beckstein, 1996; Greenberg, 1990; Shapiro, 1991) , whereas others have yielded nonsignificant results (e.g., Colquitt & Chertkoff, 2002; Gilliland, 1994; Schaubroeck et al., 1994) .
Other studies have connected explanation provision and adequacy to more general responses to the decision-making event. For example, many scholars have examined the effects of explanations on cooperation responses. Tyler and Blader (2000) defined cooperation responses as those that "act to promote the goals of the group" (p. 3). Some of these responses may be in-role, such as task motivation, performance, or refusal to work for competing groups. Others may be extra-role, such as citizenship behavior or demonstration of particularly strong levels of loyalty. In contrast, other studies have focused on retaliation responses. Skarlicki and Folger (1997) defined retaliation responses as "adverse reactions to perceived unfairness by disgruntled employees toward their employer" (p. 434). Some of these responses may be very active responses, such as theft or complaints, whereas others may be passive, such as anger, blame, or stress. Some studies have shown that explanations promote cooperation or reduce retaliation (e.g., Colquitt, 2001; Gilliland, 1994; Greenberg, 1990; Konovsky & Folger, 1991; Schweiger & DeNisi, 1991) , whereas others have failed to show significant effects (e.g., Bies, Shapiro, & Cum-mings, 1988; Brockner, DeWitt, Grover, & Reed, 1990; Colquitt & Chertkoff, 2002) .
Finally, still other scholars have linked explanations to withdrawal responses. Hulin (1991) defined withdrawal responses as "the set of behaviors that dissatisfied individuals enact to avoid the work situation" (p. 476). Most of the responses examined by past researchers comprise withdrawal from an existing organizational relationship (e.g., turnover intentions, absenteeism). However, other forms of withdrawal serve to prevent a relationship from even developing. For example, an individual may possess low application intentions regarding a job opening, or a customer may refuse to engage in further business with an organization. As with the outcomes discussed earlier, some studies have shown that explanations reduce withdrawal (e.g., Ball et al., 1993; Conlon & Murray, 1996) ; others have yielded nonsignificant results (e.g., Rousseau & Tijoriwala, 1999; Schaubroeck et al., 1994) .
Application of Fairness Theory
Several theories, models, and frameworks can provide insights into what the effects of explanations should be and where and when they should be strongest or weakest. These include attribution theory (e.g., Wong & Weiner, 1981) , work on the interactive effects of outcomes and procedures (e.g., Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996) , and discussions of interactional justice (e.g., Bies & Moag, 1986) . These works could help ground a subset of the predictions tested in our meta-analysis, but we are aware of only one theory that is relevant to the entire set. This theory, first introduced in Folger and Cropanzano (1998) , is fairness theory. It is a reconceptualization of an earlier theory called referent cognitions theory (Folger, 1986a (Folger, , 1986b (Folger, , 1987 (Folger, , 1993 .
Fairness theory posits that the assignment of blame or accountability is a necessary step in reacting to decision-making events (Folger & Cropanzano, 1998 . It therefore describes the process by which individuals go about forming perceptions of blame. In particular, the theory argues that individuals assign blame by comparing what happened to what might have been (Folger & Cropanzano, 1998 . These mental simulations of other possible events are referred to as counterfactuals because they literally are contrary to the facts.
There are two kinds of counterfactuals that interact to determine blame or accountability: could counterfactuals and should counterfactuals. Could counterfactuals compare what the decision maker did to what the decision maker could have done (Folger & Cropanzano, 1998 . When people engage in this type of counterfactual thinking, they are trying to decide if there were other feasible alternatives within the discretion of the decision maker. According to fairness theory, if the individual determines that there were other feasible options over which the decision maker had control, then it is possible to assign blame (Folger & Cropanzano, 1998 ).
The process of should counterfactual thinking forms the second half of the accountability judgment. Should counterfactuals compare what the decision maker did to what he or she should have done, from an ethical perspective (Folger & Cropanzano, 1998 ). This type of counterfactual therefore concerns the evaluation of good versus bad and right versus wrong. According to the theory, for an event to be unfair, it must violate the ethical standards to which people are expected to adhere (Folger & Cropanzano, 1998 .
Fairness theory also describes the process individuals use to judge the impact of the events that affect their lives. Specifically, would counterfactuals compare a person's current state of wellbeing with mental simulations of other, perhaps more positive, states (Folger & Cropanzano, 1998 ). The theory argues that individuals will evaluate an event as having less negative impact when the current state of well-being is similar to other imagined states. Figure 1 illustrates how the three counterfactuals interact. The reciprocal arrows indicate that the formation of the counterfactuals can, theoretically, occur in any order (Folger & Cropanzano, 1998 . The arrows also illustrate that all three counterfactuals must be activated for an individual to perceive an injustice. As an example, if a person sees an event as favorable (thereby failing to activate the would counterfactual), there is little reason to imagine what the decision maker could have or should have done differently. Without negative impact, there is no reason to consider blame (and vice versa).
Fairness theory is uniquely suited to describing why explanations should have beneficial effects. From the perspective of the theory, explanations have the potential to deactivate both the could and the should counterfactuals (see Figure 1 ). The act of providing an excuse can demonstrate that some external cause or mitigating circumstances made the decision necessary or unavoidable. The more adequate the excuse is, the more the recipient will see the event in question as the only feasible option. Thus, excuse provision and adequacy can impact the could counterfactual, breaking the could-should chain that determines blame and accountability.
Similarly, the act of providing a justification can demonstrate that the decision was appropriate in light of some superordinate goal. The more adequate the justification is, the more the recipient will see the event in question as ethically defensible. Thus, justification provision and adequacy affect the should counterfactual and again prevent an injustice from being perceived. The fact that justifications and excuses affect different mechanisms illustrates the utility of fairness theory in an explanations context. The theory is capable of illustrating exactly why two different forms of explanations can be beneficial.
We, therefore, made the following predictions for explanation provision and explanation adequacy. Note that our hypotheses use the term beneficial effects for simplicity, meaning positive effects on procedural justice, distributive justice, and cooperation but negative effects on retaliation and withdrawal.
Hypothesis 1: Explanation provision (whether excuse or justification) will have beneficial effects on procedural and distributive justice and cooperation, retaliation, and withdrawal responses.
Hypothesis 2: Explanation adequacy (whether excuse or justification) will have beneficial effects on procedural and distributive justice and cooperation, retaliation, and withdrawal responses.
Moderators of Explanation Effects
Our first two hypotheses predicted beneficial main effects for explanation provision and adequacy, but it is clear that existing studies have yielded inconsistent results. As noted earlier, some studies have yielded strong effects of explanations on justice judgments and other responses (e.g., Conlon & Murray, 1996; Gilliland & Beckstein, 1996; Greenberg, 1990; Shapiro, 1991) , and other studies have not (e.g., Brockner et al., 1990; Colquitt & Chertkoff, 2002; Gilliland, 1994; Schaubroeck et al., 1994) . What can explain these inconsistencies? One obvious possibility is sampling error, but it seems likely that some moderating variables could be altering the strength of explanation effects.
The identification of such moderators is important practically and theoretically. Practically speaking, we noted that many organizations are often reluctant to offer explanations because of concerns over potential litigation or for the protection of confidential information. An examination of relevant moderators can show when that practice is likely to be most damaging. Theoretically speaking, moderators answer the critical "who-where-when" questions needed for sound theory development (Whetten, 1989) . As Campbell (1990) notes, often the goal of a scientist should not be to test whether a hypothesis is supported or refuted but rather to determine the conditions under which a relationships holds.
We, therefore, used fairness theory to identify specific moderators that could alter the strength of explanation effects. Each of the moderators is predicted to have some impact on the counterfactual mechanisms contained within the theory. These moderators took the form of substantive characteristics of the studies included in our meta-analysis and are summarized in the Appendix. Three specific moderators were examined in this review: the type of explanation, outcome favorability, and the context in which the decision-making event occurred.
Type of Explanation
Hypotheses 1 and 2 predicted beneficial effects for explanations, regardless of whether the explanations take the form of excuses or justifications. However, it is certainly important to examine whether one type of explanation is more effective than the other. As shown in the Appendix, several studies in the existing literature have examined one specific type of explanation-either excuses or justifications. Other studies have varied the type of explanation within the study by manipulating it across experimental conditions. Still other studies have used self-report measures of explanations without specifying excuses or justifications, which creates unmeasured variance in explanation type. For example, Brockner, Konovsky, Cooper-Schneider, Folger, Martin, and Bies (1994) used this survey item: "My supervisor carefully explained to me why I was laid off" (p. 401). Some participants could be recalling justifications while responding to this item, whereas others could be recalling excuses.
Of the studies with classifiable explanations, which should yield stronger effects: those using excuses or those using justifications? The studies that manipulated both justifications and excuses within a single study can provide insights into this question. We are aware of six such studies. Three of those studies found excuses to have more beneficial effects on retaliation responses (assignment of blame, perceived need for disciplinary actions) and withdrawal responses (time taken to return for a subsequent experiment; Crant & Bateman, 1993; Gonzales, 1992; Tata, 2000) . Two other studies have found opposite results, with justifications having more beneficial effects on justice perceptions and perceptions of explanation adequacy (Bobocel & Farrell, 1996; Conlon & Ross, 1997) .
The sixth study, by Gilliland et al. (2001) , used fairness theory to frame its predictions. The authors termed excuses could reducing explanations and justifications should reducing explanations. Their first study included a should reducing explanation; the results failed to illustrate main effects on procedural justice, distributive justice, or cooperative responses (recommendation intentions). Their second study included a could reducing explanation, which did in fact improve procedural justice and cooperative responses (recommendation intentions). Their third study included both types of explanations, with the two yielding similar results.
Although the studies cited previously are split on the issue, various aspects of Folger and Cropanzano's (1998) discussion of fairness theory suggest stronger effects for excuses than justifications. After describing the could counterfactual in terms of feasible options and discretionary conduct, the authors described the should counterfactual as a "key basis for linking people's discretionary conduct [italics added] with the consequences of that conduct" (p. 188). Similarly, they described should counterfactuals as "morally superior alternatives in the feasible set [italics added]" (p. 189). Although the authors argue that the counterfactuals may be considered in any order, their discussion implies that should issues will not even be explored if the could counterfactual is not activated.
If should counterfactuals only consider feasible actions, then excuses should be more powerful than justifications. Specifically, excuses have the power to deactivate both the could counterfactual (by directly demonstrating a lack of feasible options) and the should counterfactual (by indirectly preventing even the consideration of moral standards). Justifications are incapable of deactivating both counterfactuals, because they admit-by definitionthat other feasible options were possible (though less morally appropriate). Thus, the mechanisms discussed in fairness theory are uniquely capable of differentiating the power of excuse and justification effects.
Finally, we should note that Schlenker's (1980) discussion of explanations provides more support for the powerful effects of excuses. Schlenker (1980) emphasized the importance of being directly responsible for a decision event by writing, "responsibility is the adhesive that links an actor to an event and attaches an appropriate sanction to the actor who deserves it" (p. 126). When that adhesive is removed, no consideration of the justifiability of an event is necessary. We therefore predicted:
Hypothesis 3: Explanations will have more beneficial effects when they take the form of excuses rather than justifications.
Outcome Favorability
In addition to type of explanation, it is important to examine whether outcome favorability alters the strength of explanation effects. As shown in the Appendix, several studies in the extant literature have used uniformly low outcome favorability (e.g., examining individuals rejected for a job or denied a resource request). Several other studies have varied outcome favorability. In these studies, outcome favorability was varied by manipulating it across experimental conditions or by using self-report measures to assess passive variance in it. It is important to note that no study has ever used uniformly high outcome favorability.
Which studies should yield stronger effects: those using low outcome favorability or those using varying outcome favorability? The studies that manipulated outcome favorability can provide insights into this question. Several of those studies have illustrated interaction effects by showing stronger explanation effects in low outcome favorability conditions (e.g., Colquitt & Chertkoff, 2002; Folger & Martin, 1986; Gilliland, 1994; Gilliland & Beckstein, 1996; Ployhart et al., 1999; Schaubroeck et al., 1994) . However, the effects have been inconsistent within the studies; significance is achieved for some outcomes but not for others.
Even though the studies cited previously remain somewhat inconclusive, the fairness theory's would counterfactual provides support for the interaction prediction. Recall that the would counterfactual is used to create perceptions of negative impact (Folger & Cropanzano, 1998 . If this counterfactual is not activated, then no injustice can be perceived. In such cases, any knowledge gained from the explanation-whether it concerns feasibility or justifiability-would be of limited importance. In contrast, when individuals can easily envision better states of well-being, they should attend more to the information provided in the explanation, making explanation more powerful. Because studies that use low outcome favorability should be more likely to activate the would counterfactual, we made the following prediction:
Hypothesis 4: Explanations will have more beneficial effects when outcome favorability is low than when outcome favorability varies.
Context
The studies on explanations have occurred in a variety of contexts. The Appendix provides information on what exactly is being explained within each of the studies included in our review. In some cases, the outcome being explained has been a selection decision or layoff decision (e.g., Brockner et al., 1990; Gilliland, 1994; Gilliland et al., 2001; Wanberg et al., 1999) . Other studies have examined situations where bosses deny resource requests or take credit for subordinates' ideas (e.g., Bies & Shapiro, 1987; Bobocel, Agar, Meyer, & Irving, 1998) . Still others have studied explanations in the context of a pay cut, a merger, a change in job structure, or a relocation (Daly & Geyer, 1994; Greenberg, 1990; Rousseau & Tijoriwala, 1999; Schweiger & DeNisi, 1991) .
These widely varying contexts likely have implications for the would counterfactual in fairness theory. Specifically, it is likely that the perceived impact of decision events is higher in some contexts than in others, thereby increasing the importance of explanation provision and adequacy. If so, the key question becomes how to differentiate contexts according to their perceived impact. Unfortunately, there is no agreed upon framework or taxonomy for classifying contexts according to their impact. There are, however, frameworks that help explain why fairness matters in various situations. These frameworks include the instrumental model, the relational model, and the moral virtue model (for reviews, see Cropanzano, Byrne, Bobocel, & Rupp, 2001; Cropanzano, Rupp, Mohler, & Schminke, 2001 ).
The instrumental model argues that fair treatment matters to individuals because it conveys a sense of control over long-term economic outcomes (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Thibaut & Walker, 1975) . According to this model, the provision of an adequate explanation should be more critical when the outcome has important economic consequences. As shown in the Appendix, several of the studies in the literature have indeed occurred in contexts that should possess instrumental impact. These include decisions that directly affect the hiring, compensation, and termination of the study respondents, as well as contexts involving resource requests and budget proposals. All of these contexts have direct economic consequences for the individual. Other studies have occurred in contexts that lack direct economic consequences, such as when coworkers are laid off, an individual receives negative criticism, or a smoking ban is initiated.
The relational model argues that individuals value fairness, because it signals that they are valued members of their key relationships (Lind, 1995; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 1999; Tyler & Lind, 1992) . Proponents of the relational model have consistently argued that fairness matters more when individuals feel more connected to, and included in, organizational relationships (Lind, 1995 (Lind, , 2001 Tyler, 1994; Tyler, Degoey, & Smith, 1996) . As Tyler (1999) summarized, "the strength of the social connection that people have to an organization-shapes the importance they place upon the quality of treatment they receive from organizational authorities" (p. 230). Elsewhere he notes, "The relational model also predicts that people will care more about how they are treated by others when they are dealing with people with whom they share a common group membership" (p. 232). These kinds of predictions have been supported in a number of studies (e.g., Holbrook & Kulik, 2001; Smith, Tyler, Huo, Ortiz, & Lind, 1998) .
As shown in the Appendix, several of the studies included in our review have occurred in contexts that should possess relational impact. That is, the studies have occurred in cases where the participants shared a common group membership with the authority in question. These include studies in organizations that examine pay cuts or freezes, disciplinary actions, important job changes, or layoffs of coworkers. They also include laboratory studies that create hypothetical group memberships through vignettes that discuss bosses taking credit for subordinates' ideas, directors distributing funds inaccurately, and so on. Other studies have not occurred in contexts of shared group membership. For example, studies that examine hiring decisions possess little relational impact, because the person receiving the explanation is not an organizational member. Likewise, studies that survey respondents who have been laid off (often by approaching them during applications for unemployment benefits) occur in settings where shared membership no longer exists. Thus, these studies possess less relational impact, despite their obviously strong instrumental impact.
Finally, the moral virtue model argues that fairness is valued simply because it is the right thing to do Folger, 2001) . In other words, it has value beyond its instrumental or relational implications. According to this model, an adequate explanation should be more critical when the outcome has violated some moral standard. Several of the studies in the Appendix occurred in contexts that could be termed morally charged. These include cases where a boss takes credit for a subordinate's idea, disrespectful criticism is given, drug testing is initiated, deception occurs, a diversity initiative decides hiring, or an employee is sexually harassed. In these studies, explanations may or may not be needed to quell instrumental concerns, but they will be needed to deal with concerns about right and wrong.
To summarize, the instrumental, relational, and moral virtue models can provide a theoretically grounded means of classifying the impact of various contexts. To return to the language of fairness theory, outcome favorability affects the level of impact, as captured by the would counterfactual. In contrast, we would argue that the study context affects the type of impact. As contexts take on more multifaceted forms of impact, by possessing instrumental, relational, and moral virtue implications, explanations should become more important. After all, the explanation is fulfilling multiple purposes in such cases. We therefore predicted:
Hypothesis 5: Explanations will have more beneficial effects in contexts where the instrumental, relational, and moral virtue impact are high rather than low.
Method
We conducted a meta-analytic review of the explanations literature to test the hypotheses described previously. The methods for this review are described in the following discussion.
Literature Search
First, we conducted a literature search of both the PsycINFO and Web of Science databases for the years 1986 through 2001. We began our review in 1986 to coincide with the publishing of Bies and Moag (1986) , which can be credited for increasing the visibility of explanations within the justice literature. We later conducted a second literature search containing other databases (ABI-Inform and ERIC) and less restrictive years (going back to 1968 when Scott and Lyman's review was published). This second search was conducted to ensure that our original criteria had not omitted any relevant articles.
The key words used in our literature searches were explanations, accounts, excuses, justifications, and interactional justice. We also conducted reference checks of several review articles in the explanations and justice literatures. One such review was Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, and Ng's (2001) meta-analysis of the organizational justice literature. That review examined the effects of informational justice (an aggregate of explanation provision and explanation adequacy) on a variety of outcomes, although no moderators were examined in that review.
Our search yielded a total of 93 independent samples. Four of these were redundant with other samples and were therefore excluded (Ball, Trevino, & Sims, 1994; Bies & Shapiro, 1987, Study 3; Bies & Shapiro, 1988, Study 2; Daly, 1995) . Twenty-seven samples were excluded because they did not contain any of the relationships contained in our hypotheses (e.g., Bobocel & Farrell, 1996; Crant & Bateman, 1993; Gaines, 1980; Giacalone & Rosenfeld, 1984; Gonzales, 1992; Pence, Pendleton, Dobbins, & Sgro, 1982; Shapiro, Buttner, & Barry, 1994; Tedeschi, Riordan, Gaes, & Kane, 1983) . For example, Crant and Bateman (1993) , Gonzales (1992) , and Tedeschi et al. (1983) manipulated type of explanation but neither explanation provision nor explanation adequacy. Finally, eight samples were excluded because they could not yield codeable information (e.g., Bies, Martin, & Brockner, 1993; Greenberg, 1991) . For example, Bies et al. (1993) reported regression results, but meta-analysis requires zero-order effect sizes (whether in the form of correlations, t or F statistics, or means and standard deviations). These exclusions left us with a total of 54 independent samples, as shown in the Appendix.
Data Coding
All three authors were present for the coding of all information from each article and had to reach consensus before any data point was entered. For each study, we coded the following: the zero-order correlation for the explanation relationship, the sample size, and the reliability of the explanation and dependent variables. We also coded information on the moderators examined in our hypotheses: the type of explanation used (justification vs. excuse); outcome favorability (varying vs. low); and the impact of the context in terms of the instrumental, relational, and moral virtue models (high vs. low).
Meta-Analytic Methods
We followed the meta-analytic procedures described by Hunter and Schmidt (1990) . We first computed a weighted average correlation using the study sample sizes. We then corrected these weighted average correlations for unreliability in both the independent and dependent variables. In instances where reliability estimates were not reported, we used the weighted average of all the reported reliabilities for that variable, which ranged from .84 to .88. Reliability data were reported most frequently for the five outcomes and for explanation adequacy, with the number of studies failing to report reliability ranging from 2 to 5. Reliability was reported less frequently for explanation provision, where 20 of the 30 studies manipulated provision. Such studies do not typically quantify the degree of random error in the manipulations.
The meta-analysis results reported in our tables include both the uncorrected (r) and corrected (r c ) correlation estimates. We also reported the 95% confidence interval for the uncorrected correlation. To provide an index of the variation in the corrected correlations across studies, we reported the standard deviation of the corrected correlation (SDr c ). To assess the extent to which sampling error and unreliability are driving that variation, we calculated the percentage of variance explained by artifacts (abbreviated V art ). According to Hunter and Schmidt (1990) , moderators likely exist in a relationship if artifacts fail to account for at least 75% of the variance in the correlations. However, this 75% rule has been amended by Mathieu and Zajac (1990) to be 60% in situations where there is no correction for range restriction.
To test for moderators of explanation effects, we created a data set composed of all the correlations from all the studies, along with the relevant study characteristics. This data set was initially composed of 129 correlations (54 independent samples with an average of 2.39 correlations per sample). We transformed the correlations so that higher values indicated more beneficial effects, regardless of the dependent variable. We then aggregated that data set to the sample level by averaging across multiple correlations. The end result was a data set with 54 aggregate correlations and several dummy variables that were used to capture the moderator variables. It is important to note that this aggregate data set was only used to test our moderator hypotheses.
We should also note that methodological characteristics of the studies were coded for potential use as control variables. Specifically, we coded whether the study relied on a laboratory or field design and whether hypothetical vignettes were used. Neither methodological characteristic affected the size of the explanation correlation. The average correlation for the 25 laboratory studies was .31, as compared to .35 for the 29 field studies (t ϭ .78, ns). Similarly, the average correlation for the 14 vignette studies was .34, as compared to .33 for the 40 nonvignette studies (t ϭ .17, ns). Thus, the choice of research methods seems to have little effect on explanation correlations.
Results

Main Effects of Explanations
Hypothesis 1 predicted that explanation provision would have beneficial effects on procedural and distributive justice as well as cooperation, retaliation, and withdrawal responses. Hypothesis 2 made the same predictions for explanation adequacy. As shown in Tables 1 and 2 , both hypotheses received support. Explanation provision was significantly related to procedural justice (r ϭ .28, r c ϭ .32), distributive justice (r ϭ .21, r c ϭ .26), cooperation (r ϭ .28, r c ϭ .32), and retaliation (r ϭ Ϫ.33, r c ϭ Ϫ.39), although not to withdrawal (r ϭ Ϫ.10, r c ϭ Ϫ.12). Explanation adequacy was significantly related to all five outcomes (r ϭ .49, r c ϭ .54, for procedural justice; r ϭ .40, r c ϭ .45, for distributive justice; r ϭ .20, r c ϭ .24, for cooperation; r ϭ Ϫ.37, r c ϭ Ϫ.43, for retaliation; and r ϭ Ϫ.16, r c ϭ Ϫ.19, for withdrawal). Table 2 also breaks down the response variables into more specific categories. For the most part, differentiation between in-role versus extra-role cooperation (e.g., task performance vs. citizenship behaviors) did not alter the size of explanation effects, neither did differentiation between active versus passive retaliation (e.g., theft vs. blame). However, explanation adequacy did have a significantly stronger effect on withdrawal from potential relationships (r ϭ Ϫ.59, r c ϭ Ϫ.69) than existing relationships (r ϭ Ϫ.10, r c ϭ Ϫ.12), although the former is only based on k ϭ 2.
Moderators of Explanation Effects
The results in Tables 1 and 2 suggested the existence of moderators. The variance accounted for by artifacts illustrated that sampling error and unreliability only accounted for an average of 25% of the variance in the meta-analytic correlations. This falls far below the 60% cutoff for the existence of moderators. We therefore examined the effects of our three moderators-type of explanation, outcome favorability, and context-on the size of the explanation correlations. Table 3 presents correlations between the moderator variables and the size of the explanation correlation Note. r ϭ uncorrected weighted average correlation; 95% CI ϭ 95% confidence interval around the uncorrected correlation; r c ϭ corrected weighted average correlation; SDr c ϭ standard deviation of the corrected correlation; k ϭ number of samples; N ϭ total sample size; V art ϭ percentage of variance in r c explained by study artifacts.
taken from the 54 independent samples. The first column of the correlation matrix shows that explanation correlations were lower for justifications than for excuses (r ϭ Ϫ.39) and when outcome favorability was varying rather than low (r ϭ Ϫ.31). Explanation correlations were higher when the context possessed relational impact (r ϭ .30) and moral virtue impact (r ϭ .41). These results offer some support for Hypotheses 3-5. However, it is important to note that there was moderate multicollinearity among the moderator variables (see Table 3 ). We therefore tested the moderator predictions using multiple regression, with the results shown in Table 4 . It is important to note that the regression was based on 36 samples rather than 54, because 18 samples used self-report measures of explanations that were not classifiable as justifications or excuses. The unstandardized Bs in Table 4 can be interpreted as the mean difference in correlations explainable by the variable in question. Thus, Table 4 shows that explanation correlations were .14 lower for justifications than for excuses and were .09 lower for studies with varying outcome favorability rather than low ( p Ͻ .10). Table 4 also shows that the correlations were .14, .11, and .23 higher when the study context possessed instrumental, relational, and moral virtue forms of impact, respectively.
Discussion
In general, the results of our meta-analytic review demonstrate the predictive utility of fairness theory in the context of explanations. The mechanisms discussed in the theory were used to derive main effect predictions for explanation provision and adequacy, and both predictions received support. The specific counterfactuals described by the theory were able to predict the differential effects of excuses and justifications as well as the moderating effects of outcome favorability and study context. These results suggest that fairness theory, which had previously been used in only two studies (Colquitt & Chertkoff, 2002; Gilliland et al., 2001 ), has some utility as an integrative theory of reactions to decision events. We are aware of no other theory that could have provided grounding for all five of the hypotheses tested in our review.
Overall Effects of Explanations
In terms of our specific results, we predicted that explanation provision and adequacy would have beneficial effects on five specific outcomes: procedural and distributive justice and cooperation, retaliation, and withdrawal responses. Our results show that explanations were quite powerful, whether the dependent variable was a justice judgment or a more general response. Indeed, many of our results illustrate the practical significance of explanations. For example, if we convert our explanation adequacy-retaliation result into a binomial effect size display (see Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991, pp. 281-286) , we see that employees are 43% less likely to retaliate after a decision if an adequate explanation is provided.
One interesting, though unexpected, pattern was that explanation adequacy tended to have more beneficial justice effects than explanation provision. This suggests that an inadequate explanation may be deemed more unfair than failure to provide one at all. A better understanding of adequacy is needed to understand such a result. Although many studies assess adequacy only in vague terms, some have operationalized adequacy in terms of length, clarity, or legitimacy (e.g., Greenberg, 1994; Mansour-Cole & Scott, 1998; Mellor, 1992) . Similarly, Shapiro et al. (1994) showed reasonableness to be a key dimension of adequacy. It would seem that a cursory, unreasonable, or illegitimate explanation could be harmful in two respects. First, the benefits to the could or should counterfactuals in fairness theory would fail to materialize. Second, the unreasonable or illegitimate content might itself violate ethical standards, which would further amplify the should component of the theory. This second effect would not occur to the same extent in the absence of any explanation. To test such notions, future researchers should consider adequacy and provision together, so that inadequate explanations can be compared to no explanation conditions. Such research would benefit from tapping multiple dimensions of adequacy, including legitimacy, reasonableness, or sincerity.
Boundary Conditions for Explanation Effects
Even though the overall effects of explanations are impressive, they clearly vary across studies. In an attempt to explain these inconsistencies, we used fairness theory to identify moderator variables that could alter the strength of explanation effects. One such moderator was type of explanation. We reasoned that excuses are capable of deactivating both the could and should components of fairness theory. An adequate excuse shows that no other actions were feasible, which deactivates the could counterfactual. Moreover, because comparisons to ethical standards only occur for the feasible set, the should counterfactual can also be deactivated. Our results support this reasoning, as excuses had more beneficial effects than justifications.
This result may seem surprising to those who view excuses as somehow more self-serving and less forthright than justifications. However, the key is to realize that excuse has become a pejorative term in everyday language. As used in the academic literature, it means only that the content of the explanation focuses on a denial of responsibility or claim of mitigating circumstances. We suspect that framing our predictions in terms like causal accounts or mitigating accounts would make our results seem less surprising.
In any event, future research should continue to compare excuses and justifications to assess where and when they function best. Such research would benefit from a more detailed process focus that explores the specific cognitions that are triggered when any explanation is received. For example, justifications may incite more cognitive resistance than excuses, because it may be easier to disagree with the merits of a superordinate goal than the reality of a mitigating circumstance. Alternatively, individuals may be biased against accepting that a negative outcome was justifiable due to self-serving or egocentric biases.
A potentially useful tool for process-focused explanations research is verbal protocol analysis (Ericsson & Simon, 1980 , Ericsson & Simon, 1993 , where individuals are asked to "think out loud" in response to some stimulus. This kind of analysis could uncover the different cognitive processes that are prompted by excuses and justifications. Of course, the issue of adequacy again becomes critical. It may be that an illegitimate or insincere excuse is somehow more damaging than an illegitimate or insincere justification. After all, at least the latter admits some responsibility for the event, even if the specific reasons given are not convincing. In addition to explanation type, we examined the moderating role of outcome favorability. We predicted that explanations would be more beneficial in studies with unfavorable outcomes. After all, fairness theory argues that the activation of the would counterfactual is necessary for individuals to attend to could and should issues. Our results tend to support this reasoning, as explanations had stronger effects in studies using low outcome favorability. These results also offer additional support for the more general outcome Favorability ϫ Process Fairness interaction seen in the larger organizational justice literature (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996) . It may be that individuals simply attend less to the explanation content in the absence of unfavorable outcomes, or it may be that the explanation actually creates conflicting reactions. The gesture of the explanation may be appreciated, but the content of it could cause individuals to react to the event less favorably. This would be especially likely if the positive outcome was found to be a function of the context, rather than the individuals' merit.
Finally, we also reasoned that explanations would become particularly critical in certain study contexts. The instrumental, relational, and moral virtue models were used to create a framework for gauging the impact of various contexts. Our results show that all three models can shed light on which contexts make explanations most impactful. Explanation effects were particularly strong when the context had instrumental (i.e., economic) implications, as in hiring, layoff, compensation, budget, and resource decisions. However, our results also suggest that explanations have value beyond their ability to shed light on future economic well-being.
Specifically, explanations are more powerful when the recipient possesses high levels of inclusion or shared group membership. They are also more powerful when the explanation concerns a morally charged event, such as deception or controversial organizational decisions (e.g., drug testing, diversity initiatives). Thus, explanations can be important even for decisions with no economic consequences, because they can reaffirm the quality of a relationship or counteract a presumed ethical violation. Of course, process-focused research is needed to identify exactly what cognitions explanations trigger in different contexts. It may be that different types of explanations become more appropriate in different kinds of contexts. For example, individuals may be more resistant to justifications in morally charged contexts.
Practical Implications
Taken together, our results illustrate that the failure to give an explanation-or the use of an inadequate one-can lead to negative employee reactions. Many of these employee reactions, most notably retaliation and withdrawal, carry with them substantial costs to the employer. With that in mind, we return to the notion that tough times can lead to bad management (Folger & Skarlicki, 2001) . Recall that Folger and Skarlicki (2001) argued that the delivery of bad news causes managers to distance themselves because of emotional distress, fear of being blamed, or concerns about making the situation worse. Managers may therefore believe that explaining a decision will only worsen the situation (as in the opening quote from The Rivals). They may also be worried about triggering a lawsuit based on some detail, which leads to an explanation that really explains nothing at all (as in the opening quote from Don Juan).
If tough times really do lead to these forms of bad management, then there is no better time to emphasize the importance of explanations. Newspaper headlines announce layoffs and pay cuts on an almost daily basis. For example, a recent front page article in USA Today cited a Towers Perrin survey showing that 53% of companies were likely to cut pay to reduce costs versus 37% before September 11th (Armour, 2002) . The article went on to point out that explanations for the pay cuts have "never been more important," otherwise employees may attribute their cut to a decrement in job performance (p. A1).
Our results support the prescriptions made in that article. Managerial distancing will likely take a bad situation and make it worse, as employees react to the unexplained bad news with less cooperation, more retaliation, and more withdrawal. Similarly, worries about lawsuits may ironically cost more money than they save, given that litigation is a form of retaliation that should be decreased-not increased-by adequate explanations. Dunford and Devine (1998) made a similar argument in the context of wrongful termination, arguing that adequate explanations signify fair treatment and therefore lower the likelihood of legal action.
In summary, we would echo earlier narrative reviews that argued that explanations should become a necessary ingredient in virtually any decision-making process (e.g., Bies & Moag, 1986; Folger & Bies, 1989; Tyler & Bies, 1990) . In particular, explanations are vital in contexts with instrumental, relational, and moral virtue implications and when outcomes are unfavorable. Indeed, when one considers the practical benefits of explanations (e.g., a 43% reduced likelihood of retaliation) relative to their costs, it is difficult to envision an adequate excuse (or justification) for not offering them.
